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Abstract
We introduce a speciﬁcation of habit formation featuring non-separability
between consumption and leisure into an otherwise standard New Keynesian
model. The model can be estimated with standard Bayesian techniques and
the bond pricing implications are evaluated using higher-order approximations.
The model is able to reproduce a sizeable risk premium on long-term bonds
and the cyclicality of ﬁscal policy has an impact on the bond premium that
is quantitatively important. Technology, government spending, and mark-up
shocks are the main drivers of the time-variation in bond premia.
Keywords: DSGE models, ﬁscal policy, bond risk premium, monetary policy.
JEL Classification Numbers: E5, E6, G1.5
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Non-technical summary
At the heart of the nexus between ﬁscal policy and ﬁnancial stability lies the ques-
tion of the impact of ﬁscal policies on government risk premia. However, standard
macroeconomic models are not very well suited to shed light on the interactions be-
tween ﬁscal rules, monetary policy, and risk premia.
In order to study the bond pricing implications of ﬁscal policy, we start by in-
troducing a speciﬁc assumption concerning household’s preferences into a standard
New Keynesian model. Our ﬁrst main ﬁnding is that this modiﬁcation improves the
model’s ability to jointly explain macroeconomic and ﬁnancial market facts. In par-
ticular, when simulated using higher-order approximations, the model estimated with
macroeconomic and ﬁscal aggregates is able to generate a sizeable, and time-varying,
bond premium. This relative success opens the door for studying the interaction be-
tween government bond risk premia and ﬁscal policy.
Turning to policy issues, our main ﬁnding is that modest changes in the cyclicality
of ﬁscal spending can have a signiﬁcant impact on the bond risk premium. Compared
to the estimated model, increasing the degree of pro-cyclicality leads to an increase
in the bond premium that can be quite large. Overall, the sensitivity analysis that is
performed suggests that adopting counter-cyclical policy rules could help to contain
risk premia during periods of high risk aversion.
Adopting pro-cyclical ﬁscal policy rules also has a destabilizing eﬀect on the busi-
ness cycle. Increasing ﬁscal expenditures in boom periods creates an additional demand
that leads to stronger price pressures, higher interest rate volatility, and a higher bond
premium. The higher volatility of inﬂation can be oﬀset by the central bank by becom-
ing more responsive to changes in inﬂation. While this policy succeeds in containing
inﬂationary pressures, it comes at the cost of increasing interest rate volatility which,
in turn, raises the cost of government debt ﬁnancing. Pro-cyclical ﬁscal policy therefore
creates an unfavorable trade-oﬀ between macroeconomic stabilization and government
bond risk premia.6
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1 Introduction
At the heart of the nexus between ﬁscal policy and ﬁnancial stability lies the question
of the impact of ﬁscal policies on government risk premia. However, macroeconomic
models are not very well suited to shed light on the interactions between ﬁscal rules,
monetary policy, and government bond risk premia. The risk premium produced by
standard macroeconomic models such as Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) or
Smets and Wouters (2007) is too small and not volatile enough (Hordahl, Tristani, and
Vestin, 2008; Rudebusch and Swanson, 2008; Rudebusch, 2010). Furthermore, append-
ing a term structure to these models ﬁnds only limited support in the data (De Graeve,
Emiris, and Wouters, 2009). At the same time, standard asset pricing models which
are targeted on the reproduction of risk premia typically fall short of important dimen-
sions such as plausible inﬂation dynamics, labor markets, or a meaningful ﬁscal sector.
As explained by den Haan (1995), the key problem of standard macroeconomic models
is to generate a co-movement which implies that bond prices are low in states where
marginal utility, or ”hunger” is high.1
The co-movement between macroeconomic aggregates and ﬁnancial variables im-
plied by changes in government spending is particularly diﬃcult to reconcile with the
sizeable bond premium observed in the data. According to the textbook IS-LM model,
an increase in government spending should lead to an increase in interest rates, inﬂa-
tion and consumption. In most asset pricing models, however, a rise in interest rates
and inﬂation leads to a decline in bond prices. If bond prices are low in good times,
when marginal utility is low and consumption is high, long-term bonds provide a hedge
against unforeseen movements in consumption and the bond premium could even be
negative (Backus, Gregory, and Zin, 1989). The co-movement implied by changes in
ﬁscal policy should therefore reduce the compensation required to induce investors to
hold government debt and contribute to worsen the bond premium puzzle.
1To generate a sizeable bond premium the model is not only required to get the sign of the
co-movement right but also to produce enough volatility to match the size of the bond premium.
Producing this volatility has also proven to be challenging.7
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We start by augmenting a version of the New Neoclassical Synthesis (NNS) model
(Goodfriend and King, 1997; Woodford, 2003; Gal´ ı, 2008) featuring an explicit ﬁs-
cal block, with habit formation in the composite of consumption and leisure (Jaccard,
2010). Our ﬁrst main ﬁnding is that the model can generate a sizeable and time-varying
bond premium. This relative success opens the door for studying the interaction be-
tween the bond premium and ﬁscal policy. Counterfactual policy experiments are then
conducted to study how changes in the cyclicality of ﬁscal policy aﬀect the size of the
bond risk premium.
The main distinguishing feature of this preference speciﬁcation is to link marginal
utility to movements in the composite of consumption and leisure (as opposed to a
standard speciﬁcation that only depends on consumption). In a model where this spec-
iﬁcation is combined with sticky prices, the key is that the response of hours worked
can have a ﬁrst-order impact on the dynamics of marginal utility. If an increase in
government spending leads to an increase in hours worked that is suﬃciently large and
persistent, the ﬁscal expansion could lead to a decline in the composite good even if
consumption increases. Since a decline in the composite good raises marginal utility,
this mechanism implies that changes in ﬁscal policy could potentially generate the
negative co-movement between marginal utility and bond prices that is needed to in-
crease the bond premium. Determining whether this eﬀect is quantitatively signiﬁcant
however remains an empirical question.
To assess the empirical relevance, the model is estimated with Bayesian likelihood-
based techniques. From an empirical perspective, the main advantage of habit forma-
tion (Abel, 1990; Constantinides, 1990; Jermann, 1998; Campbell and Cochrane, 1999;
Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher, 2001) is that standard linearization techniques can
be employed. Consequently, the approach set out by An and Schorfheide (2007), and
Smets and Wouters (2007) can be followed to estimate the key structural parameters
based on a ﬁrst-order approximation.2 To ensure that the size and the dynamics of
2To evaluate the bond pricing implications the model is simulated at posterior mode using higher-
order approximations. Note that under Epstein-Zin preferences the structural parameters of the utility8
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the bond premium are driven by the business cycle properties of the model economy,
ﬁnancial variables are not included into the set of observable variables.3
Our ﬁrst main ﬁnding is that, when simulated using higher-order approximations,
the model estimated with macroeconomic and ﬁscal aggregates is able to generate a
sizeable, time-varying bond premium. Second, technology and government spending
shocks are the main drivers of the time-variation in bond premia and, for the combina-
tion of estimated parameter that we obtain, changes in ﬁscal policy generate a negative
co-movement between marginal utility and bond prices.4 Introducing ﬁscal policy into
the analysis therefore contributes to the resolution of the bond premium puzzle. And
as in the IS-LM model, expansionary ﬁscal policies lead to an increase in consumption,
an empirical fact that is typically diﬃcult to reproduce within this class of models
(Gal´ ı, L´ opez Salido, and Vall´ es, 2007; Monacelli and Perotti, 2008). Third, we ﬁnd
that modest changes in the cyclicality of ﬁscal spending can have a signiﬁcant impact
on the bond risk premium. Compared to the estimated model, increasing the degree of
pro-cyclicality leads to an increase in the bond premium that can be quite large. Over-
all, the sensitivity analysis that is performed suggests that adopting counter-cyclical
policy rules could help to contain risk premia during periods of high risk aversion.
Adopting pro-cyclical ﬁscal policy rules also has a destabilizing eﬀect on the business
cycle, increasing the volatility of inﬂation and output, and the size of the risk premium.
If ﬁscal authorities increase their expenditure in boom periods, the additional demand
that is created leads to stronger price pressures, higher interest rate volatility and a
higher bond premium. The higher volatility of inﬂation can be oﬀset by the central
bank by becoming more responsive to changes in inﬂation. While this policy succeeds
in bringing down inﬂation volatility, it comes at the cost of increasing interest rate
function can not be estimated using standard techniques (van Binsbergen, Fernandez-Villaverde, Koi-
jen, and Rubio-Ramirez, 2010).
3This empirical strategy also considerably reduces the number of degrees of freedom since a speciﬁc
value for the bond premium will not explicitly be targeted.
4This negative co-movement is obtained for changes in both the systematic and the non-systematic
components of ﬁscal policy.9
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volatility. This increased volatility is then transmitted to the term premium via the
term structure of interest rates and raises the cost of government debt ﬁnancing. Pro-
cyclical ﬁscal policy therefore creates an unfavorable trade-oﬀ between macroeconomic
stabilization and government bond risk premia that is diﬃcult to avoid using standard
interest rate policies.
Diﬀerences in the cyclicality of ﬁscal policy have been widely documented in the
literature (Lane, 2003; Gal´ ı and Perotti, 2003), and evidence of pro-cyclicality in ﬁscal
policy has been uncovered in a number of studies (Gavin and Perotti, 1997; Talvi and
Vegh, 2005). However, as pointed out by Leeper (2010), in comparison to the vast
literature on monetary rules and on the monetary transmission mechanism, it is fair
to say that research on ﬁscal rules, including the implications of cyclical ﬁscal policy,
has received considerably less attention.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and
section 3 describes the estimation results. Section 4 discusses the counterfactual policy
experiments. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We present a variant of a NNS model (Goodfriend and King, 1997; Woodford, 2003;
Gal´ ı, 2008; Smets and Wouters, 2007) where the government collects taxes, issues
long-term non-defaultable bonds, uses its proceeds to consume private goods produced
by monopolistically competitive ﬁrms and makes lump sum transfers to households.
Households consume, pay taxes, provide labour for the monopolistic ﬁrm, trade one-
period bonds and invest in long-term bonds issued by the government. Firms hire
labour from the households and produce a diﬀerentiated good subject to identical
technology. Firms price their products subject to a Calvo friction. Monetary and
ﬁscal authorities control the short-term nominal interest rate as well as government
consumption, the labour income tax rate and lump-sum transfers, respectively.10
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2.1 Households
The economy is populated by representative, inﬁnitely-lived households who solve the







































Xt = mXt−1 +( 1− m)Ctv(1 − Nt) (3)
where Ct(i) is the quantity of good i consumed by the household in period t; Pt(i)
is the price of good i; Nt is the quantity of labour; Wt is the nominal wage; BS
t are
nominally riskless one-period bonds (purchased at time t and maturing at date t+1),
with the nominal price QS
t ; BL
t are nominally riskless coupon bonds with price QL
t
that pay a geometrically decaying coupon in perpetuity, with decay factor δc; TR t
is the lump sum component of income (transfers); t is the (time-varying) own price
elasticity of demand of good i; tt is labour tax rate; Xt denotes the habit stock; m is
the habit stock parameter; β is the discount factor and U(.) is a concave and v(.)i s
a convex function in its arguments and will be speciﬁed below. E is the mathematical
expectations operator.
The ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to bond holdings and consumption give rise11
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where UC denotes the marginal utility of consumption. Note that QS
t =( 1 + it)−1, where
1+it denotes the yield of a one-period discount bond.5 The second Euler equation (5)
is the pricing formula for government long-term bonds. The optimal choice of labour







where UN denotes the marginal disutility of labour. The representative household also
decides on the allocation of its consumption expenditures among diﬀerentiated goods.












1−t is the aggregate price index, and Ct denotes aggregate
private consumption.
2.2 Speciﬁcation of utility
We assume that the utility function takes the following form:
U(Ct,X t−1,N t)=




where σ is the curvature parameter of utility, Ct is consumption, Xt−1 is the predeter-
mined habit stock, and where v(1 − Nt)=φ +( 1− Nt)ς satisﬁes the usual regularity
5Note that this equations implies that, approximately, it = −log(QS
t ).12
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conditions.6 The curvature parameter σ is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion in
the composite good Ctv(1−Nt).7 The law of motion of the habit stock Xt depends on
the composite good Ctv(1 − Nt), reﬂecting the key assumption that habits are formed
over the aggregate of consumption and leisure. Compared to a standard speciﬁcation
of habit formation (Abel, 1990; Constantinides, 1990; Jermann, 1998; Campbell and
Cochrane, 1999), the introduction of leisure provides households with an additional
margin which can be used to control the evolution of the habit stock. The habit pa-
rameter m controls the rate at which the stock of habits depreciates, while 1 − m
determines the sensitivity of the reference level with respect to changes in the compos-
ite good. The second habit parameter 0 ≤ b<1 measures the importance of the habit
motive in utility.8
Given this speciﬁcation of utility and assuming internal habit formation, it can then
be shown that:
UC(Ct,X t−1,N t)=( Ctv(1 − Nt) − bXt−1)
−σ)v(1 − Nt) (9)
+(1 − m)v(1 − Nt)ϕt,
UN(Ct,X t−1,N t)=( Ctv(1 − Nt) − bXt−1)
−σ)CtvN (10)
+(1 − m)ϕtCtvN.
where ϕt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the habit accumulation equation
and vN is the ﬁrst derivative of leisure utility with respect to N.
6See King and Rebelo (1999) for a discussion of the regularity conditions. Note that φ is pinned
down by the steady state of the model while ς controls the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
7For further details of this speciﬁcation of utility, see Jaccard (2010).
8Compared to the speciﬁcation used in Jaccard (2010), we use a speciﬁcation with b and m allowing
for an additional degree of freedom in order to facilitate the estimation procedure. When b is set to
zero, the model reduces to a speciﬁcation without habit formation.13
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2.3 Firms
Following the standard New Keynesian setup, we assume that there is a continuum of
ﬁrms indexed by i ∈ [0,1]. Each ﬁrm is owned by the households, produces a diﬀerenti-
ated good using a homogenous technology. Firms’ production possibilities are given by
the production function: Yt(i)=AtNt(i)1−α. At represents the common level of tech-
nology that follows an AR(1) process. We assume that capital is ﬁxed at unity. All ﬁrms
face identical isoelastic demand schedules (7) and take aggregate prices and quantities
as given. We make the typical assumption that each ﬁrm may re-set its price only with
probability 1−θ. The average price duration is given by 1/(1−θ). A ﬁrm re-optimizing
in period t chooses the price P ∗
t that maximizes the current market value of the proﬁts
















Ct+k,for k =0 ,1,2,.... Note that
Ψt+k is the cost function at time t + k and Yt+k|t denotes output in period t + k for a
ﬁrm that last reset its price in period t.























where M≡ ¯  






denotes the marginal cost function at time t+k for the ﬁrm that last re-set its price at




marginal costs. Typically, this optimal price setting condition is linearized around the
zero inﬂation steady state (Gal´ ı, 2008). However, since we use higher-order approxima-
tion, we re-write condition (12) in a recursive form, and use perturbation methods to14
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evaluate the recursive form of the ﬁrst-order condition around the deterministic steady
state price level where
P∗
t
Pt−1 = 1 and Πt−1,t+k =1 . For details, see Appendix C.
2.4 Pricing of long-term bonds and risk premium
The pricing of the assets in this economy is based on the household’s valuation of fu-
ture payoﬀs of the assets, being it future proﬁt streams of the ﬁrms or the payment
structure associated with government bonds. Future payoﬀ streams are valued on the
basis of the stochastic discount factor introduced in equation (11). Following Rude-
busch and Swanson (2008), we have simpliﬁed the computational burden associated
with the introduction of a 10-year bond by assuming that the government issues long-
term, default-free bonds that pay a geometrically declining coupon in every period in












where δc is the rate of decay of the coupon on the bond and mt+1 is the (nominal)
stochastic discount factor between period t and t +1 . 10 The decay factor δc controls
the duration or maturity of the bond. When δc → 0, this bond behaves increasingly
like a short-term asset, while higher values of δc imply an increasing duration of the
bond.









c =1+δc exp(−it) ˆ Q
L
t+1, (14)













t denotes the price of a bond with maturity s.
10This is essentially the Euler condition for long-term bonds given in equation (5). This is computa-
tionally far less burdensome, since pricing of long-term ﬁnancial claims based on exact Euler equation
involves pricing of all the claims up to maturity L. Using equation (13) involves only one additional
state variable.15
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s=0 is and the second equality in equation (14) follows from the ﬁrst-
order expansion of equation (13).
One commonly-used measure of the bond risk premium is based on the diﬀerence
between the risk adjusted yield-to-maturity and the risk-neutral yield-to-maturity of
the bond.11 The continuously-compounded yield-to-maturity iL













































Another commonly-used measure of the bond risk premium is based on the excess
(realized) one-period holding return (ehr
t ). The holding-period return on a bond is the
return from holding the bond for a single period and selling it before maturity. The
excess holding-period return is deﬁned by subtracting the current short-term rate from










In this case, the bond risk premium can be interpreted as a compensation for the
risk averse investors for the possible capital loss on a long-term bond if it is sold before
maturity and/or the risk due to erosion of the bond’s value by inﬂation.
11Yield-to-maturity is the constant rate of discount that equates the net present value of future
coupon payments with the current market price of the bond.
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Note that the unconditional expectation of the bond risk premia based on the
measures in equation (18) and (17) are identically, when computed in a second-order
approximation. The implied variances of the two measures however, diﬀer with regard
to the property that the excess holding return has a non-zero variance, while equation
(17) gives a zero variance in a ﬁrst- or second-order approximation.
The slope of the yield curve is given by the diﬀerence between the yield-to-maturity
on the long-term bond and the one-period risk-free rate it, i.e. slt = iL
t − it.13
2.5 Government
The government in the economy collects taxes, issues non-defaultable long-term bonds
and uses the revenues for government consumption and transfers. There is no seignor-













St = τt(Wt/Pt)Nt − (Gt + TR t), (20)
where St denotes the primary surplus. τt,G t and TR t denote the labour income tax
rate, government consumption and lump sum net transfers respectively. BL
t denotes
the dollar value of long-term nominal bonds outstanding and QL
t denotes the nominal
price of the bonds sold at time t. Note importantly that, in contrast to one-period
debt, the nominal value of debt (QL
t BL
t ) depends on bond prices, which in turn depend
on expected future inﬂation. Hence, the current nominal value of debt outstanding
depends on the expected path of future inﬂation, and hence on monetary policy. In
contrast to the case of a one-period bond, this implies that the nominal value of debt
outstanding at time t is not predetermined.
13For details and discussion on diﬀerent measures of risk premium, see e.g. Rudebusch and Swanson
(2008).17
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For further use, we deﬁne:








= τt(WtNt/PtYt) − (GY,t + TR Y,t). (21)
as the ratio of the real value of the primary surplus to current output. As for the law
of motion of government bonds, we deﬁne BL
PY,t ≡ BL
t /(YtPt) as the ratio of the real













Fiscal policy is characterized by the following feedback equations:
GY,t = GY − φGY(
Yt
¯ Y
− 1) − φGB(
DY,t−1
DY
− 1) + ε
G
t , (23)
τt = τ + φτY(
Yt
¯ Y
− 1) + φτB(
DY,t−1
DY
− 1) + ε
τ
t, (24)
TR Y,t = TR Y − φTRY(
Yt
¯ Y
− 1) − φTRB(
DY,t−1
DY




































where GY,D Y and τ denote the steady state values of the ratio of government consump-
tion to output, the debt ratio and the labour income tax rate. εG, ετ
t and εTR
t capture




t are unexpected (discretionary) changes to government spend-
ing, taxes and transfers and ρj captures the degree of serial correlation of the ﬁscal
14Note that BPY,t and SY,t are stationary variables such that the steady state version of (22)
collapses to SY =( 1− β)DY , Π=1 , ΔY = 1 where DY ≡ δcQLBL
PY is the steady state real
government debt to output ratio. This follows from the Euler equation (5) which in the steady state
with zero inﬂation and zero growth implies that 1/QL =( 1− δcβ).18
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shocks. Parameters φjB, for j = G, τ and TR capture the feedback of government
spending, taxes and transfers on the government debt to output ratio, while φjY cap-
tures the extent to which ﬁscal policy co-moves with the business cycle, because of
automatic stabilizers. In general, these feedback coeﬃcients direct (in a reduced form
way) the systematic features of ﬁscal policy. Note that transfers are lump-sum in our
model and have an allocative role only through the ”second-round” feedback eﬀects on
labour taxes and government spending.
Finally, monetary policy is characterised by the usual interest rate feedback rule,
given by














and where ρi is the interest rate smoothing coeﬃcient and φπ and φy are the usual
feedback coeﬃcients on inﬂation and trend output gap, and Πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1. The equi-
librium real interest rate in the model is given by log(1/β). ηi,t captures iid shocks to
monetary policy.
2.6 Market Clearing
There are three markets (goods, labour and bond markets ) that need to be in equi-
librium at each point of time. We assume that the household’s initial long-term bond
holdings are positive such that QL
−1BL
−1 > 0, while net holdings of one-period bonds
are zero in equilibrium. Market clearing in the goods market requires that at time t :
Yt(i)=Ct(i)+Gt(i) for all i ∈ [0,1]. Assuming that the government decides on the al-












Yt,Y t = Ct + Gt (30)19
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Inverting the production function Yt(i)=AtNt(i)1−α and using (30), it follows from
















where Δp,t is a measure of price dispersion across ﬁrms. Consequently, in the symmetric







See Appendix B for a description of the treatment of the price dispersion term.
3 Estimation
The model is estimated using Bayesian full information estimation methods as in An
and Schorfheide (2007). For our data sample, we use U.S. quarterly data from 1971Q1
to 2007Q4. As observable variables, we use consumption, inﬂation, Federal funds
rate (short-term nominal interest rate), the government consumption to output ratio,
labour income tax revenues and the transfers to output ratio. All quantity variables
are linearly de-trended and measured in real terms. Inﬂation and short-term interest
rate are de-meaned and expressed in annualized terms. The detailed description of
the construction of the variables is provided in Appendix F. Corresponding to the six
observable variables, there are six exogenous shocks: productivity shocks, government
spending shocks, labour income tax shocks, transfer shocks, interest rate shocks and
mark-up shocks. Except for interest rate shocks, which are assumed to be iid, all other
shocks follow a ﬁrst-order autoregressive process.
We estimate the model using the ﬁrst-order Taylor approximation around the deter-
ministic steady state, but stochastically simulate the second- respectively third-order
Taylor approximation of the model around the non-stochastic steady state in order to20
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compute the bond risk premium.15
3.1 Calibrated parameters
The model is calibrated around a steady state with zero inﬂation. It is important to
note that the risk premium is zero in the deterministic steady state.16
Table 1 in Appendix A shows the values assigned to the parameters of the model
that are calibrated. In the ﬁscal block of the model, the key parameters are the
government debt to output ratio DY, the government consumption to output ratio GY,
lump-sum transfers TR Y, and the decay parameter δc, which controls the maturity of
the government bonds. DY,G Y and TR Y are calibrated using U.S. quarterly data
from 1971 until 2007, such that DY =0 .33,G Y =0 .076 and TR Y =0 .104. Following
Leeper, Plante, and Traum (2010), we target the ﬁscal variables relevant for the federal
government, not the general government. These, together with other parameters of the
model, imply that the steady state labour income tax rate τ is 0.23 and the steady
state primary surplus to output ratio SY is 0.01.17 δc is set equal to 0.9848, following
Rudebusch and Swanson (2008). This implies a Macaulay duration for the government
bond of 10 years (40 quarters).18 The discount rate β is set to equal 0.997, which is a
standard value used in the literature.
Regarding households, we calibrate ς to 1.66 and σ to 1. We do not attempt to
estimate these parameters as they are poorly identiﬁed. We choose φ such that the
15Estimation and simulations were done using Dynare, available at http://www.dynare.org;A d -
jemian, Bastani, Juillard, Mihoubi, Perendia, Ratto, and Villemot (2011).
16In higher-order approximations the assumption on steady state inﬂation is not innocuous, see
(Ascari and Rossi, 2011). To avoid possible repercussions of the mean of inﬂation on the determination
of the risk premium we calibrate the model around a zero inﬂation steady state. When estimating
the model we bridge the diﬀerence between the means implied by data and by the model by suitable
measurement equations.
17See Appendix F for exact deﬁnitions of the variables and other details of the data.
18The Macaulay duration is a measure of the average length of time for which money is invested,





(1+it)t/Q, where D denotes the Macaulay duration of the bond, m is the maturity, i is the
yield and Q is the price of the bond. In the case of continuous compounding, the same formulae can
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representative household devotes 20% of its time to market activities in the model’s
steady state. As for the supply side of the model, we set the steady state price mark-
up to 20%. This is achieved by setting the price elasticity of demand   to 6 in the
model’s steady state. The production function curvature parameter is set to unity. All
remaining parameters are estimated.
Turning to the choice of priors, which are reported in Table 2, on the ﬁrm and
household side, we set the Calvo parameter to 0.6, implying an average contract du-
ration of 2.5 quarters. The prior on the two habit formation parameter are 0.6 and
0.9. For the interest rate rule we start from a Taylor type rule where the inﬂation
response coeﬃcient is set to 2 and the output response coeﬃcient is set to 0.5. The in-
terest rate smoothing parameter is set to 0.7. These are all quite standard calibrations.
Concerning the ﬁscal rules we set the response to debt to 0.03 for taxes and for expen-
ditures and to 0.015 for transfers. We set the prior on the cyclical response coeﬃcient
for expenditures to 0.0. A negative coeﬃcient for this parameter implies that ﬁscal
policy is pro-cyclical. All priors on the shock persistence are set to 0.7. The priors
on the standard deviations of the innovations are calibrated to roughly reproduce the
variances of the observable variables. The remaining parameter values are reported in
Table 2.
3.2 Estimation results
Table 2 in Appendix A reports the estimation results. The estimation results in the
posterior mode column give the value of the structural parameters obtained from
the maximized log posterior distribution with respect to the model parameters. The
next column gives the respective standard deviations. The second set of results gives
the mean, 5th and 95th percentile of the posterior distribution obtained from the
Metropolis-Hastings sampling algorithm based on 700,000 draws.
Turning to the parameter estimates we ﬁnd that most of the parameter estimates
are in line with comparable studies. On the household side the sensitivity of habits to22
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overall utility b is estimated to be 0.83 implying an important contribution of habit
formation to overall utility. The depreciation of the habit level m is estimated to be
0.9, pointing towards a considerable degree of memory in the habit formation process.
The speciﬁc form of our utility makes it diﬃcult to compare these estimates directly
with previous studies. The estimation of the Calvo parameter implies an average
price duration of 9 quarters which is on the high side, but in line with the results of
comparable studies.19
Turning to the policy rules and starting with the monetary policy rule our estimates
are in line with Smets and Wouters (2007). We ﬁnd a slightly lower response of interest
rates to inﬂation and a higher response to the output level, where it is important to
note that Smets and Wouters have an additional term on the change in output.
On the ﬁscal side the comparison to other studies is less straightforward. The paper
by Leeper, Plante, and Traum (2010) is closest to our approach, because they are also
relating the ﬁscal instruments to output and debt and use a comparable dataset for
the ﬁscal variables. The estimated coeﬃcients, however, are not directly comparable
because the deﬁnitions of the explanatory variables is diﬀerent. The signs of estimated
coeﬃcients are the same in both studies, but we ﬁnd a stronger role for the cyclical
elements.
4 Fiscal policy, monetary policy, and the bond risk
premium
4.1 Results and accuracy test
Table 3 reports some stylized facts of the data underlying the estimation procedure
and reports some further ﬁnancial statistics that do not enter as observable variables
19Following the proposal by Eichenbaum and Fisher (2007), Smets and Wouters (2007) use a Kimball
aggregator to overcome the problem of an overstated price duration estimates in DSGE models. The
reduced form estimate of the Phillips Curve coeﬃcients in Smets and Wouters however is close to our
estimate.23
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into the estimation but serve as reference statistics to measure the success of the model
to replicate ﬁnancial data. Focusing on the ﬁnancial variables (including measures of
the bond premium), we observe that the measures of the risk premium based on the
diﬀerence between the risk adjusted yield-to-maturity and the risk-neutral yield-to-
maturity of the bond (ψ
40
t , equation 17) is around 106 basis points while the measure
based on the excess holding return (ehr
t , equation 18) is substantially higher around
176 basis points. The slope of the yield curve is positive, with a mean of around 96
basis points. The standard deviation of the ﬁnancial variables are on average higher
than the standard deviations of the real variables.
To evaluate the empirical relevance of the model, the estimated values of the struc-
tural parameters discussed in section 3.2 are used to compute simulated moments,
based on a second-order approximation for the main macro variables and third-order
approximations for the measures of the risk premium. Table 3 below reports a series
of ﬁnancial market and business cycle moments generated by the model and compares
them with the data. Starting from the main macroeconomic variables, the ﬂuctuations
of output and consumption, measured by the standard deviations, fall short of the ﬂuc-
tuations observed in the data. Hours worked are more volatile in the model reﬂecting
the lack of an extensive margin of employment adjustment and the high degree of price
rigidities in the model. The standard deviations of the ﬁscal variables in the model are
close to those found in the data with the exception of the debt to output ratio, where
the model variable displays overstated ﬂuctuations. Turning to the correlations with
output, we ﬁnd that the model matches the high correlation coeﬃcients found in the
data for the macroeconomic variables. On the ﬁscal ratios we ﬁnd that the correlations
with output are more diﬃcult to match. The ratio of government expenditure over
output has a positive correlation with output while the data ﬁnds a negative relation
between the two variables. For the ﬁnancial variables, the model matches the mean of
the variables rather well. We ﬁnd that the interest rate volatility in the model is only
moderately higher than in the data. Inﬂation volatility is slightly lower in the model24
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than in the data.
Turning to the risk premium, we ﬁnd that the benchmark model is able to generate a
mean bond premium, ψ
40, of 72 basis points without coming at the cost of an overstated
variability of the main macro and ﬁnancial variables. Within this class of models, this
seems to constitute a signiﬁcant improvement. As shown and reviewed by Rudebusch
and Swanson (2008), state of the art NNS models with standard speciﬁcation of habit
formation (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) or Smets and Wouters (2007))
usually ﬁnd it diﬃcult to generate a bond premium larger than 10 basis points.
[Table 3 to be inserted around here]
The ﬂexibility of our Bayesian approach allows us to further assess the model’s
ability to explain the bond premium by taking into account the impact of parameter
uncertainty. Figure 1 in Appendix A reports the simulated distribution of the mean
bond premium generated by the model.
Compared to the estimated model, switching-oﬀ habit formation would lead to a
dramatic decline in the bond premium. The chosen preference speciﬁcation plays a key
role in producing a sizeable risk premium in the model economy and opens the door
for studying the asset pricing implications of ﬁscal policy.
The time-variation in bond premium can be studied by simulating the model at
posterior mode using a third-order approximation. Compared to the asset pricing
literature (Campbell and Cochrane, 1999; Bansal and Yaron, 2004; Cochrane and Pi-
azzesi, 2005; Piazzesi and Schneider, 2007), the advantage of our Bayesian approach
is that it also allows us to exploit the information provided by macroeconomic aggre-
gates to decompose these movements. The contribution of macroeconomic shocks can
be analyzed, and as shown by Figure 5, technology, government spending, and mark-up
shocks are the main drivers of the time-variation in bond premia.
The accuracy of the higher-order approximations have also been checked by per-
forming a series of Euler equation tests. As shown in Table 7, the low mean absolute25
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errors that we found indicates that both the second and the third-order approximations
are reliable. In situations where the actual series is far from its steady state value, we
also ﬁnd that the third-order approximation performs better than the second-order
approximation.20
4.2 What drives the risk premium?
As illustrated by Table 4 in Appendix A, in this economy, 97 percent of the historical
variance of output are explained by technology and government expenditure shocks.
Technology shocks are the main driving force and explain more than ﬁfty percent of
the total variance of output. Inﬂation is largely driven by the mark-up shock and the
technology shock. Technology shocks and government expenditure shocks also explain
most of the variance of marginal utility and bond prices.21
The key is that both the government spending and the technology shocks generate
a negative co-movement between marginal utility and bond prices. As explained by
den Haan (1995), generating this co-movement which implies that bond prices are low
in states where marginal utility, or ”hunger” is high, is the key challenge. If bond prices
are high in states where marginal utility is high, long-term bonds are a hedge against
unforeseen movements in consumption and in some cases the bond premium can even
be negative (Backus, Gregory, and Zin, 1989).
The model’s ability to increase the bond premium essentially relies on the introduc-
tion of habit formation in the composite of consumption and leisure (Jaccard, 2010).
This speciﬁcation of habit formation induces a particular consumption smoothing mo-
tive which overcomes the diﬃculties induced by the introduction of endogenous labor
supply. The key is that this speciﬁcation of habit formation reduces ﬂuctuations in the
composite good Ctv(1−Nt), and at the same time increases the volatility of marginal
utility. Greater ﬂuctuations in marginal utility increase the volatility of the stochastic
20See Figure 4 in Appendix D, lower panel.
21The high importance of technology and government spending shocks to explain output and inﬂa-
tion dynamics is also found by Curdia and Reis (2010).26
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discount factor which in turn lead to larger ﬂuctuations in bond prices. This joint
eﬀect on the co-movement of the stochastic discount factor and bond prices enables
our NNS model to generate a higher bond risk premium than usually reported. Given
the importance of technology and government spending shocks, the remainder of this
section focuses on the contribution of these two shocks.
Technology shocks
As argued above, technology shocks can only contribute to explaining the risk pre-
mium if they imply a negative and sizable covariance structure between the stochastic
discount factor and bond prices.
Figure 2 shows that in the case of a positive technology shock, prices go down. For
standard coeﬃcients in the monetary policy rule, this induces a decline in interest rates
leading to an increase in bond prices. Following the rise in bond prices the co-movement
described above will only be obtained if marginal utility declines.
In the standard NNS model it is diﬃcult to reproduce a sizeable reduction in
marginal utility after a positive technology shock. The standard model does produce a
positive response in consumption and a decline in marginal utility. However the decline
in hours limits the positive response of private consumption, such that the quantita-
tive response of marginal utility is rather small for reasonable parametrizations. The
negative response of hours is due to the price stickiness which forces proﬁt maximizing
ﬁrms to reduce labour demand in order to take advantage of an increase in total factor
productivity.22
[Figure 2 to be inserted around here]
Under our speciﬁcation of multiplicative preferences, the decline in hours leads
to a gradual rise in the composite good, Ctv(1 − Nt) and in combination with habit
22In contrast to this, in an RBC model prices adjust instantaneously downward leading ﬁrms to
increase hiring. As a result, the consumption response (and hence the response of marginal utility) is
relatively stronger in the RBC model in comparison to the NNS model.27
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formation, to a sizable decrease in marginal utility.23 Given a high degree of price
rigidities the response of hours is relatively large, implying a strong reaction of marginal
utility. The strong reduction in labour demand induced by price stickiness leads to a
decline in output in the short run. For this speciﬁc combination of parameters, as in
Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (2006), in the short run, technology shocks can therefore
be contractionary in our model.
Government spending shocks
Adopting a speciﬁcation of preferences which links the stochastic discount factor
to future expected paths of the composite good implies that also government spending
shocks contribute to explaining the risk premium.
As in all models with intertemporal optimization an increase in government spend-
ing implies a negative wealth eﬀect associated with the expectation of higher future
net-taxes. The negative wealth eﬀect implies an increase in labor supply. Furthermore
we ﬁnd that the households increase consumption to compensate for the disutility
eﬀects of higher hours worked.24
[Figure 3 to be inserted around here]
The hours response leads to a reduction in current and expected levels of the com-
posite good, Ctv(1 − Nt), compare Figure 3. While consumption and output rise, the
fact that the increase in government spending forces agents to work harder reduces the
composite good and raises marginal utility. Furthermore, the demand induced expan-
sion leads to an increase in inﬂation and interest rates and consequently to a decline
in bond prices.
23Compare Uhlig (2007) and Campbell and Cochrane (1999) for an analysis habit formation and
asset pricing in an RBC context and Rudebusch and Swanson (2008), Ravenna and Sepp¨ al¨ a (2007)
and Wei (2009) for similar studies in a DSGE context.
24The positive response of consumption is due to the non-separability of consumption and leisure in
the utility function as discussed in Linnemann (2006). Compared to Rudebusch and Swanson (2011),
the positive response of consumption to government spending shocks is an important distinguishing
feature of our approach.28
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Since this mechanism generates a negative co-movement between marginal utility
and bond prices in this economy, introducing ﬁscal policy into the analysis contributes
to the resolution of the bond premium puzzle.
Monetary policy shocks
In our economy, monetary policy shocks have the potential to generate qualitative
implications that are consistent with ﬁnancial market data. As in Wei (2009) however,
the size and the persistence of the monetary policy shock that would be needed to
have a signiﬁcant impact on the bond premium is clearly implausible. Deviations from
interest rules of such a magnitude are never observed in practice.
4.3 The role of ﬁscal and monetary policy
This section uses the framework described above to assess the impact of ﬁscal rules
on business cycle aggregates and on the bond risk premium. Out of the three ﬁscal
instruments that have been introduced only government consumption GY,t has signiﬁ-
cant quantitative implications. Taxes, τt, have very little eﬀect, and by construction,
transfers, TR Y,t, have no direct impact on the allocation of resources. Hence, in what
follows, we focus on the cyclical properties of government consumption.
Fiscal stabilization
To assess the quantitative implications of pro-cyclical ﬁscal policies, we perform
a series of counterfactual experiments by varying the sensitivity of government con-
sumption to trend output gap. Compared to the estimated ﬁscal rules for government
consumption, we approximate diﬀerences in the degree of pro-cyclicality by varying
the coeﬃcient φGY in the ﬁscal rule:
GY,t = GY − φGY(
Yt
¯ Y
− 1) − φGB(
DY,t−1
DY
− 1) +  
G
t .
Compared to the estimated rule (φGY =0 .31), in the ﬁrst experiment we study29
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the consequences of pro-cyclical ﬁscal policy by setting φGY to -0.20. One may also
interpret this experiment as a variation in the level of automatic stabilization induced
by ﬁscal policy.
The results reported in Table 5 clearly show that ﬁscal rules can have large quanti-
tative implications. As far as business cycle variables are concerned, more pro-cyclical
ﬁscal policy unambiguously leads to an increase in the volatility of output and inﬂation.
Interestingly, as shown by the last row of Table 5, this increase in business cycle volatil-
ity is accompanied by a signiﬁcant increase in the bond risk premium. Pro-cyclical ﬁscal
policy does not only lead to destabilizing eﬀects on the business cycle but can also lead
to a dramatic increase in the bond risk premium. Compared to the estimated rule
which features counter-cyclical ﬁscal policy, the bond risk premium increases from 72
to 202 basis points when ﬁscal policy becomes moderately pro-cyclical.25
[Table 5 to be inserted around here]
Pro-cyclicality also contributes to worsen the policy trade-oﬀ faced by central banks
by raising the unconditional mean and the volatility of inﬂation. As illustrated by the
impact on the risk-free rate volatility, the rise in inﬂation and output volatility induces
larger ﬂuctuations in interest rates. Pro-cyclicality in ﬁscal policy therefore complicates
the task of the central bank by making macroeconomic stabilization more diﬃcult to
achieve.
Finally, in the last column of Table 5, we consider a case with a higher degree
of habit formation than in the benchmark case (0.88 vs. 0.83). With a larger habit
formation coeﬃcient, the impact of pro-cyclicality on the risk premium is ampliﬁed.
Our results therefore suggest that adopting counter-cyclical ﬁscal policy rules could
help to contain the rise in risk premia during periods of high risk aversion.26
25Iara and Wolﬀ (2010) study a similar question from an empirical perspective. Using a ﬁscal dataset
for euro area countries, the authors ﬁnd that the spread with respect to Germany could be reduced
by up to 100 basis points, if weak ﬁscal rules were to be upgraded, implying a stricter institutional
and legal backing for ﬁscal rules.
26This relates to the discussion on the impact of ﬁscal reforms during the ﬁnancial crisis. If a deep30
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Macroeconomic stabilization under pro-cyclical ﬁscal policy
To illustrate the consequences of pro-cyclicality, the next policy experiment consid-
ers a case where the central bank is committed to deliver price and output stability
in an economy where pro-cyclical ﬁscal policies are run by the government. The dy-
namics of the benchmark model are reported in column 1 of Table 6. Column 2 of the
same table reports a slightly modiﬁed version of the model with the only diﬀerence of
assuming a mildly pro-cyclical ﬁscal rule by setting φGY to -0.1.
Column 3 reports the dynamics of the model corresponding to the case where the
monetary authority tries to oﬀset the eﬀects of pro-cyclical ﬁscal policy on output
ﬂuctuations by raising the output gap coeﬃcient, φy. Compared to the benchmark
case, φy needs to be increased from 0.45 to 5.4 in order to bring the volatility of output
back to 0.84. Compared to the case where ﬁscal policy is counter-cyclical, output
stabilization therefore comes at the cost of increasing the bond risk premium from 72
basis points to 484 basis points.
Column 4 shows the impact of a policy response aimed at oﬀsetting the impact of
pro-cyclical ﬁscal policy on the level of inﬂation. Compared to the benchmark case,
raising the inﬂation coeﬃcient, φπ, from 1.83 to 2.83 allows the monetary authority
to bring the level of inﬂation volatility back to 44 basis points. Compared to the case
where ﬁscal policy is counter-cyclical, containing the rise in inﬂation therefore comes
at the cost of increasing the bond premium from 72 basis points to 154 basis points.
[Table 6 to be inserted around here]
Oﬀsetting the impact of a moderate increase in the pro-cyclicality of government
spending requires monetary policy to be more aggressive in order to attain the same
degree of price or output stability. While the eﬀects of pro-cyclical ﬁscal policy on
inﬂation and output can be partially oﬀset, this policy option has the side-eﬀect of
increasing the government bond risk premium. Monetary policy activism inevitably
crisis is caused by a strong increase in risk aversion a move towards a counter-cyclical ﬁscal policy can
help to sustain government ﬁnances by decreasing the cost of ﬁnancing via a lower risk premium.31
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leads to an increase in interest rate volatility. This volatility is in turn transmitted to
the term premium via the term structure of the interest rate and increases the cost of
government debt.
Automatic stabilizers and the bond premium
The previous section focused on the impact of counter-cyclical ﬁscal policy, or
automatic stabilizers, on the risk premium, conditional on the full set of shocks, as
estimated in section 3. In this section we look at the role of automatic stabilizers,
conditional on a single shock, to evaluate the robustness of our results with respect to
the shock identiﬁcation.
We start with the co-movement generated by a mark-up shock. A negative mark-up
shock which makes the economy more eﬃcient has a strong positive impact on output,
consumption, and hours worked and leads to a sharp decline in marginal utility. In the
presence of ﬁscal stabilizers, the expansionary impact on output triggers an automatic
reduction in government spending which leads to a further decline in marginal utility.
This amplifying eﬀect on marginal utility increases the volatility of the stochastic
discount factor and leads to an increase in the bond premium.
When technology shocks are the main driving force, ﬁscal stabilizers unambiguously
lead to a decline in both macroeconomic volatility and the bond premium. This result,
however, seems to depend on the fact that, in our economy, positive technology shocks
do not lead to a strong increase in output. The above discussion on mark-up shocks
seems to suggest that a diﬀerent result could be obtained, should the response of hours
worked to technology improvements be positive, as it is the case in real business cycle
models. We leave this potentially interesting issue for future work.
Following a positive monetary policy shock, output, consumption, and hours worked
go down implying an increase in marginal utility. Bond prices will go down following
the increase in interest rates. Automatic stabilizers buﬀer the reduction of demand
and reduce the increase in the bond risk premium.
Finally, in the presence of government spending shocks (i.e. discretionary changes in32
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government spending), automatic stabilizers unambiguously lead to a decline in both
macroeconomic volatility and the bond premium. This is due to the property that
positive spending shocks raise both output and marginal utility. The increase in output
triggers a decline in government spending and ﬁscal stabilizers in this case contribute
to reduce ﬂuctuations in marginal utility. These oﬀsetting eﬀects, which then lead to a
decline in the stochastic discount factor volatility, give rise to a reduction in the bond
premium.
5 Conclusions
We ﬁnd that the standard NNS model with a modiﬁed preference speciﬁcation is ca-
pable of reproducing a substantial part of the observed risk premium on government
bonds. The internal habit formation based on the composite utility of consumption
and leisure induces a substantial negative correlation structure between the stochastic
discount factor and the price of government bonds. The negative correlation is based
on the strong complementarity of consumption and hours worked as implied by the
preferences.
The bond risk premium in our model is largely driven by the technology shock and
the government spending shock. Positive technology shocks, as well as contractionary
government spending shocks, lead to a reduction in inﬂation and interest rates and
consequently to an increase in bond prices. In both cases, the shocks imply an increase
in the utility level derived from the composite good and a reduction in marginal utility
of consumption. This cyclical property gives rise to a negative correlation between the
stochastic discount factor and bond prices. Hence, bonds do not provide an insurance
against consumption risks.
Turning to policy issues, we ﬁnd that ﬁscal policy does not only contribute to
the risk premium in terms of the discretionary component of ﬁscal policy but also
in terms of its systematic, or rule based, component. More speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that33
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the degree of pro-cyclicality of government spending increases the bond risk premium.
This is largely driven by the property that pro-cyclical spending tends to de-stabilize
the economy implying an increase in the volatility of bond prices. The model suggests
imposing state-contingent ﬁscal rules with strong counter-cyclical elements. Especially
in periods of high risk aversion automatic stabilizers can be used as an instrument to
contain risk premia.
Monetary policy can contribute to counteract the destabilizing eﬀects of a pro-
cyclical ﬁscal policy, but only at the cost of an increased risk premium. Pro-cyclical
ﬁscal policy increases the variability of output and inﬂation. Monetary policy can
counteract the increased inﬂation variability by becoming more aggressive. But when
ﬁscal policy is pro-cyclical, a stronger response of interest rates to inﬂation increases the
bond premium and leads to further increases in the cost of government debt ﬁnancing.
Pro-cyclical ﬁscal policy creates an unfavorable trade-oﬀ between price stability and
government bond premia that is diﬃcult to avoid using standard interest rate policies.34
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A Tables and ﬁgures
Table 1: Values assigned to the calibrated parameters
Firms and Households Fiscal Policy
ς 1.66 β 0.997   6 GY 0.076 DY 0.33
σ 1 ¯ N 0.20 1 − α 1 TRY 0.104 δc 0.9848
Note: This table shows the parameter values chosen prior to the estimation procedure
and the steady state ratios. Note that the model is calibrated around a zero inﬂation
state. The risk premium in the deterministic steady state is zero.40
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Table 2: Parameter estimates
Parameter Prior Posterior
Type Mean Std Mode Mean 5% CI 95% CI
Firms and Households
Habit formation b B 0.60 0.05 0.83 0.82 0.79 0.86
Habit memory m B 0.90 0.01 0.90 0.90 0.88 0.92
Calvo θ B 0.60 0.15 0.90 0.89 0.87 0.91
Fiscal Policy Rules
Exp. resp. to debt φGB G 0.03 0.02 0.006 0.009 0.001 0.016
Exp. resp. to output φGY N 0.00 0.50 0.310 0.341 0.220 0.462
Tax resp. to debt φτB G 0.03 0.02 0.055 0.057 0.044 0.070
Tax resp. to output φτY G 0.01 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.002 0.015
Transfer resp. to debt φTRB G 0.015 0.010 0.003 0.004 0.0004 0.008
Transfer resp. to output φTRY N 0.30 0.2 0.059 0.067 -0.004 0.1369
Interest rate rule
Interest rate smoothing ρi B 0.70 0.15 0.89 0.885 0.86 0.91
Resp. to output φx G 0.50 0.10 0.45 0.45 0.32 0.58
Resp. to inﬂation φπ G 2.00 0.20 1.83 1.85 1.57 2.13
Shock persistence
Technology shock ρa B 0.70 0.15 0.976 0.967 0.947 0.986
Mark-up shock ρπ B 0.70 0.15 0.771 0.769 0.712 0.827
Expenditure shock ρG B 0.70 0.15 0.912 0.909 0.868 0.95
Tax shock ρτ B 0.70 0.15 0.945 0.942 0.904 0.984
Transfer shock ρTRY B 0.70 0.15 0.821 0.820 0.741 0.899
Standard Deviations
Technology shock σa G−1 0.01 0.01 0.0081 0.0079 0.0063 0.0094
Mark-up shock σπ G−1 1.00 0.10 0.9930 0.9970 0.8160 1.1720
Interest Rate shock σi G−1 0.002 0.002 0.0025 0.0026 0.0023 0.0028
Expenditure shock σG G−1 0.005 0.004 0.0031 0.0032 0.0027 0.0038
Tax shock στ G−1 0.005 0.004 0.0033 0.0035 0.0031 0.0039
Transfer shock σTR G−1 0.005 0.004 0.0032 0.0032 0.0029 0.0035
Note: B,G and G−1 correspond to Beta, Gamma and inverse Gamma distributions. Posterior densities were
computed by creating a sample of 700’000 draws with initial burning sample of 105’000 draws. Average
acceptance rate of the chain was roughly 25%. The estimation sample is 1971Q1-2007Q4.41
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1411
December 2011
Table 3: Stylized facts of the estimated model
Business Cycle Statistics
Standard Correlation
Deviation (σX) with output (ρX,Y)
Data Model Data Model
logYt 1.60 0.84 1 1
logCt 1.27 0.87 0.90 0.93
logNt 1.24 1.76 0.80 0.91
Gt/Yt 0.24 0.30 -0.59 0.09
TR t/Yt 0.40 0.39 -0.63 -0.09
Dt/Yt 1.05 2.79 -0.03 -0.72
TaxLt/Yt 0.33 0.51 0.08 0.16
Financial Statistics
Mean Std. Deviation
Data Model Data Model
rt 2.51 0.76 2.66 3.51
πt 4.04 0.44 2.62 2.71
i40
t − it 0.96 0.22 1.77 3.57
Bond Risk Premium
Mean Std. Deviation
Data Model Data Model
ψ
40
t 1.06 0.72 0.54 0.08
ehr
t 1.76 0.71 23.43 9.92
Note: This table compares the implication of the estimated model with a series of
business cycle and asset pricing stylized facts. Business cycle statistics are expressed
in logs and have been HP-ﬁltered, σX denotes the standard deviation of the vari-
able under study while ρX,Y denotes its correlation with output. As far as ﬁnancial
statistics are concerned, the mean and the standard deviation have been expressed
in annualized percent and the stylized facts for the bond premium are taken from
Rudebusch and Swanson (2008). The model implied moments are based on a second-
order approximation around the steady state, except for ψ
40
t where we resort to a
third-order approximation to capture the time-variation in bond premium.42
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Table 4: Historical variance decomposition for output, inﬂation, marginal utility and
bond prices.
Historical variance decomposition
Tech. Gov. exp. Mon. pol. Mark-up Other
(At)( Gt)( it)(  t/( t − 1)) (τt),(TR Y,t)
logYt 55.9 40.9 1.8 1.3 0.1
Πt 14.4 0.2 0.1 84.9 0.4
log UCt 69.1 10.2 12.7 7.9 0.1
log QL
t 76.5 6.1 6.7 10.6 0.1
Note: This table shows the forecast error variance decomposition of the estimated model. Shocks
to transfers have a negligible impact on the dynamics of the variables and their contributions is
therefore omitted in this table.
Table 5: Sensitivity to alternative speciﬁcations of the ﬁscal rules
Benchmark Habit, b =0 .83 High Habit, b =0 .88
Data Estimated Pro-cyclical Pro-cyclical
φGY - 0.31 -0.2 -0.2
std(logYt) 1.60 0.84 3.57 5.04
std (πt) 2.62 2.71 2.88 3.35
std (it) 3.41 4.70 7.57 11.7
Mean (ψ
40
t ) 1.06 0.72 2.02 5.28
Note: This table displays results from counterfactual experiments in the model by varying the degree
of cyclical response of government spending on output (φGY ). Business cycle statistics are expressed in
logs and have been HP-ﬁltered, std and Mean denotes the standard deviation and unconditional mean
of the respective variable. The mean and the standard deviation of ﬁnancial variables are expressed in
annualized percent.43
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Figure 1: Density of the bond premium
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Note: Annualized basis points of the risk premium (equation 17). The simulated
distribution has been constructed using the posterior distribution of the estimated
parameters given in Table 2.44
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Figure 2: Response to technology shock







































Note: This ﬁgure displays the response of selected variables to a positive technology
shock.45
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1411
December 2011
Figure 3: Response to government spending shock











































Note: This ﬁgure displays the response of selected variables to a positive government
spending shock.46
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Monetary and Baseline Output Inﬂation
Fiscal Policy (1) Mon. Policy (2) Stabilization (3) Stabilization (4)
φπ 1.83 1.83 1.83 2.83
φy 0.45 0.45 5.4 0.45
φGY 0.31 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
std(logYt) 0.84 2.10 0.84 1.99
std (πt) 2.71 2.81 2.83 2.60
Mean (πt) 0.44 0.56 0.66 0.44
std (it) 4.70 6.16 11.75 6.5
Mean (ψ
40
t ) 0.72 1.34 4.84 1.54
Note: This table displays results from counterfactual experiments in the model by varying the degree of
cyclical response of government spending on output (φGY ) and the degree of inﬂation stabilisation (φπ)i n
the ﬁscal and monetary policy rules. Business cycle statistics are expressed in logs and have been HP-ﬁltered,
std and Mean denotes the standard deviation and unconditional mean of the respective variable. The mean
and the standard deviation of ﬁnancial variables are expressed in annualized percent.47
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B Price dispersion and real marginal costs
The price dispersion term is small up to the ﬁrst-order approximation (see e.g. Gali,
2008), so it is usually dropped from the log linear approximation of the aggregate pro-































gives the evolution of aggregate inﬂation dynam-
ics. In the non-stochastic steady state, ΔP,t = 1under the assumption that price level
is constant in the steady state (for details, see Gal´ ı, 2008, chapter 3).
The equilibrium also entails the derivation of an individual ﬁrm’s marginal cost in
terms of the economy’s average real marginal cost to be used in the evaluation of opti-














MPNt+k denotes the economy’s average marginal productivity of labor and the real
wage Wt+k/Pt+k is evaluated according to the intratemporal condition from the house-
hold’s problem (6).48
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C Dynamic model equations












































































Marginal utility of consumption:
UC,t =( Ct (φ +( 1− Nt)
ς) − bXt−1))
−σ(φ +( 1− Nt)
ς) (42)
+(1 − m)(φ +( 1− Nt)
ς)ϕt (43)
Evolution of habit stock:
Xt = mXt−1 +( 1− m)Ct(φ +( 1− Nt)
ς) (44)49
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Evolution of Lagrange multiplier associated to habit stock:









+(1− m)ϕtCtς(1 − Nt)
ς−1
Economy wide real marginal costs:
MCt = wt/((1 − α)Yt/Nt) (47)
Long-term bond pricing equations (risk neutral price and risk adjusted price):
ˆ Q
L













Long-term bond yields (risk neutral yield and risk adjusted yield):
 i
L
t = log(δc ˆ Q
L
t /( ˆ Q
L
















Slope of the yield curve:
slt = i
L
t − it (53)50
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t−1 − exp(it−1) (54)
Government real budget constraint:
Q
L





−1 − SY,t (55)
Primary surplus to output ratio:




Consumption to output ratio:
CY,t =1− GY,t (58)
Consumption:
Ct = CY,tYt (59)
Fiscal rules (Government consumption, labour income tax rate, lump-sum trans-
fers):
GY,t = GY − φGY(
Yt
¯ Y
− 1) − φGB(
DY,t−1
DY
− 1) +  
G
t (60)
τt = τ + φτY(
Yt
¯ Y
− 1) + φτB(
DY,t−1
DY
− 1) +  
τ
t (61)
TR Y,t = TR Y − φTRY(
Yt
¯ Y
− 1) − φTRB(
DY,t−1
DY
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D Accuracy of the higher-order approximations
To evaluate the bond price and the implied risk-premium we have to utilize higher-order
perturbation methods. The use of these methods leads to the question how accurate
the approximations actually are. In order to evaluate the accuracy we report results
from a dynamic Euler equation test below. The basic idea of the Euler equation test is
to compare the value provided by the approximation with the exact value derived from
the Euler equation, where expectations are approximated by numerical integration.27
Since the main focus of the non-linear part of the model refers to the evaluation of
the bond risk-premium we report the accuracy results of the long-term bond pricing
equation which is the main driver of the risk premium.
Q
L











To evaluate the Euler equation we ﬁrst take all period t variables from the approx-
imation. All expectational terms in the equation are then approximated by numerical
integration.
Table 7: Properties of the dynamic Euler equation errors (in percent)
mean absolute mean max. positive max. negative
error error error error
2nd-order 0.39 -0.38 0.11 -1.77
3rd-order 0.19 -0.19 0.11 -0.67
Note: This table shows selected properties of the Euler equation errors (in percent) based on the
long-term bond prices. They are based on 2000 simulated data points, using 500 draws for the
Monte-Carlo numerical integration.
The fact that the mean absolute errors of both approximations are rather low shows
27Compare den Haan and Marcet (1994) and Santos (2000) for assessing accuracy based on Euler
Equation Residuals.53
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that both the second and the third-order approximations are reliable. The errors of
the second-order approximation (blue dash-dotted line in ﬁgure 4) become larger when
the variables drift far away from the stochastic steady state.28 In these situations the
third-order approximation (green solid line in ﬁgure 4) performs considerably better.
28In the stochastic steady state the long-term bond price has a mean of 55.37.54
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Figure 4: Euler Equation Accuracy: second- and third-order approximation






Price of the long−term bond








Euler equation error (in percent)
2nd order approximation
3rd order approximation
Note: The upper panel of this graph shows the simulated time series for the price of long-term
bonds based on the 2nd-order (blue, dash-dotted line) and 3rd order approximations (green, solid
line). In the lower panel the approximation error in percent for the 2nd- and 3rd-order are shown.
Approximation errors are calculated as the diﬀerence between the approximated bond price and
the corresponding value of the bond price that would make the Euler equation to hold exactly.
The sample window is chosen to contain the maximum error in the second-order approximation.55
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E Time variation in the bond premium
Figure 5: Time variation in the bond premium



















Note: This graph shows the contribution of the shocks to variations of the bond risk premium
around its stochastic steady state. Note that each shock also contributes to the size of the mean of
the risk premium in the stochastic steady state. For expositional clarity this eﬀect is not displayed
in the graph.56
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1411
December 2011
F Construction of data
We explain the construction of data set in detail. Our approach follows Leeper, Plante,
and Traum (2010) for ﬁscal variables, Hall (2009) for hours, and Gurkaynak, Sack, and
Wright (2007) for bond yields. Our complete dataset covers years 1955-2009, but the
model is parameterized and estimated using the period 1971Q1-2007Q4.
PY: Gross Domestic Product. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), Nipa
Table 1.1.5, line 1.
P: GDP deﬂator for personal consumption expenditures. Source: BEA, Nipa Table
1.1.4, line 2.
C: Private consumption. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Nipa Table 1.1.6,
line 2
N: Hours, measure of labour input. This is computed as N = H × (1 − U/100),
where H and U are the average over monthly series of hours and unemployment.
Source: Bureau of Labour Statistics, series LNU02033120 for hours and LNS14000000
for unemployment.
INT: Net interest payments of federal government debt. Source: Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis, Nipa Table 3.2, (line 29-line 13).
M: Adjusted Monetary Base. Source. ST. Louis Database, series AMBSL.
G: Government consumption. This is computed as G = current consumption ex-
penditures (line 21) + gross government investment (line 42) + net purchases of non-
produced assets (line 44)-consumption of ﬁxed capital (line 45). Source: BEA, Nipa
Table 3.2.
TR: Net transfers. This is computed as TR = net current transfers (line 22-line
16)+net capital transfers (line 43-line 39) + subsidies (line 32)- current surplus of
government enterprises (line 19). Source: BEA, Nipa Table 3.2.
TAXR: Total federal tax revenues. This is computed as TAXR = current tax
receipts (line 2)+contributions for government social insurance (line 11). Source: BEA,57
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Nipa Table 3.2.
S: Primary surplus. This is computed as St = TAXR t − (Gt + TR t), where Gt
is government consumption, TR t are net transfers and TAXR t are total federal tax
revenues.
D: Federal government debt. This is computed as Dt = Dt−1 + INTt − St −
(Mt − Mt−1), where St is primary surplus INTt are net interest payments of federal
government debt and Mt −Mt−1 is seignorage. The initial value of debt is set equal to
the market value of Gross Federal Debt in March 1955. Source: BEA, Nipa Table 3.2
and http://www.dallasfed.org/data/data/natdebt.tab.htm for the initial value of debt.
WNt : Labour income tax base. Source: Nipa Table 1.12, line 3.
τ : Average eﬀective labour income tax rate. Computed following Jones (2002) and
Leeper, Plante, and Traum (2010).
LTAXR: Labour tax revenues. This is computed as LTAXRt = τt × WN t, where
WN t denotes labour income tax base (Nipa Table, 1.12, line 3) and τt is eﬀective labour
income tax rate.
i: Federal funds eﬀective rate. Quarterly average over monthly series. Source:
Board of Governors of the Federal System, H.15. Selected Interest rates, Series RIF-
SPFF N.M.
iL
t : 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate. Source: Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, Series ID:GS10.
ehr
t : Excess holding return. Taken from Rudebusch and Swanson (2008).
ψ
L
t : Bond risk premium. Taken from Rudebusch and Swanson (2008).WORKING PAPER SERIES
NO 1411 / DECEMBER 2011
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